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Abstract
Deregulation and progress in information and communication technologies have increased the 
geographical expansion of banking structures and instruments. This makes banks operationally 
close to the borrowers. At the same time, banking industry consolidation have induced a 
geographical concentration of banking decision centers and strategic functions, leading to 
an increase of the functional distance that separates the decision center of a bank from its 
operational branches. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of these two trends on 
small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) lending. Our ﬁndings on French data suggest that 
(i) increased functional distance induces an increase of the investment cash ﬂow sensitivity 
considered as a measure of ﬁnancing constraints and that (ii) the relationship between 
operational proximity and ﬁnancing constraints is non linear with an investment-cash ﬂow 
relationship supposed to be increasing for low levels of operational proximity below a certain 
threshold and decreasing for high levels of it. The adverse effect of functional distance on 
ﬁnancing constraints is particularly acute for small ﬁrms. 
Keywords: SME lending, functional distance, operational proximity, ﬁnancing constraints, 
investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity
JEL Classiﬁcation: G21, G34, R51
1. Introduction
  Over the last two decades in France, all credit institutions categories have known a 
substantial decrease of their establishments’ number (see Appendix A, Figure A.1.). This 
decrease was about 22% for commercial banks over the period 1997 to 2008. It was about 
36% for mutual and cooperative banks over the same period (see Appendix A, Figure A.2.).
  This fall of the bank’s number have been following a longstanding trend. Thus, since 
the law bank of January 24, 1984, the French banking sector have been engaged in an 
intense movement of restructuring, which resulted in a steady decrease of the number of 
credit institutions. This decline was about 64% for credit institutions established in France 
(excluding Monaco) during the period 1984 to 2008.
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  The dynamic movement of reorganization and renovation of banking structures has 
been accompanied by a strengthening, since the early 2000s, of the banking system’s supply 
(see Appendix A, Figure A.3.). In fact, the number of branches, which was maintained 
during ﬁfteen years in a range of 25500 to 26000, is in progress since 2000 (27893 at the 
end of 2008 excluding branches of the postal bank). Also, the number of Automated Teller 
Machines (ATMs), which exceeds that of branches since 1997, almost doubled over the 
last ten years. Finally, the information and communication technology progress favored 
the expansion of impersonal methods to conduct businesses, such as Internet-banking, 
home-banking, or phone-banking. These changes reﬂect a research of productivity gains 
among French credit institutions, a strong dynamism and also a deep technological change 
in distribution channels.
  Both of these phenomena have a spatial dimension. The geographical diffusion of 
banking structures and instruments contributed to the ease of access to banking services by 
savers and borrowers established locally. It refers to the so called ‘operational distance’ 
considered in the banking literature. It largely depends on the physical distance that separates 
banks from their clientele. With respect to organizational structure, the wave of mergers 
and acquisitions that have reduced the number of banks and have created large national 
and multinational bank holding companies, have induced a geographical concentration of 
banking decision centers and strategic functions, leading to an increase in the ‘functional 
distance’1 that separates the decision center of a bank from its operational branches.
  In this paper, we focus on the French banking industry in order to assess the effects 
of these contrasting trends of spatial diffusion-concentration on ﬁnancing constraints for 
local SMEs.
  A large literature is devoted to assessing the impact of banking consolidation on 
local development. The vast majority of these studies follow a bank-based approach where 
they compare the lending behavior of small banks, theoretically considered as best suited to 
deliver relationship lending and therefore considered ‘close’ to the need of local small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with the lending behavior of large banks, considered as 
more ‘distant’. They ﬁnd differences in relationship lending with larger institutions tending 
to lend to older and larger SMEs with stronger ﬁnancial statements (Haynes and Berney, 
1999; Cole et al., 2004; Scott, 2004; Berger et al., 2005). There is also evidence that as 
lending decisions are taken at higher layers of the organizational structure, there is less 
emphasis on soft information penalizing small opaque ﬁrms (Liberti and Mian, 2009). 
  A few other studies follow a market based approach, where the analysis is carried 
out at the local market level (Avery and Samolyk, 2000; Berger et al., 2007; Bonaccorsi di 
Patti and Gobbi, 2001; Collender and Shaffer, 2003). This approach has the advantage of 
directly assessing the net impact of banking industry structure on local borrowers.
  In this paper, we follow the same market-based approach adopted by Alessandrini 
et al. (2009) and try to evaluate the impact of the two trends of diffusion-concentration 
of the banking system on SME ﬁnancing. Following Alessandrini et al. (2009), we have 
1 This terminology was introduced by Alessandrini, Croci and Zazzaro (2005) and subsequently 
used in several studies.83 
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tried to overcome the oversimpliﬁcation of the morphological structure’s measure of the 
local banking industry provided in the literature by introducing a more accurate measure 
of the functional distance of local banking systems from local economies. Using a pooled 
sample of 2174 French SMEs, we ﬁnd that both operational and functional distances play 
a signiﬁcant role in explaining ﬁnancing constraints of local ﬁrms.
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
main theoretical and empirical works related to our subject. Section 3 describes the data 
and the distance variables. Section 4 displays the dynamic investment econometric model 
performed and the different results obtained. The last section concludes.   
 
2. Related  Literature
2.1  Distance and lending decisions: theory and evidence 
  Economic theory recognize physical distance as causing potentially relevant 
economic costs for both the bank granting a credit and the ﬁrm seeking ﬁnancing. These 
costs are not only pecuniary such as transportation costs, but also may be informational 
costs induced by the extra efforts required from the bank to access the creditworthiness of 
potential borrowers or to monitor ﬁrm’s investments. 
  In theoretical models founded on information asymmetries, credit rationing may be 
the bank’s optimal response to the deterioration of the quality of information on distantly 
located ﬁrms. Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue that as the severity of the asymmetric 
information problem intensiﬁes with distance, local lenders can collect soft information 
on small ﬁrms over time and can strategically use their informational advantage to create 
a threat of adverse selection for more remote competitors who might not enjoy the same 
degree of access to local information. Hauswald and Marquez (2006) make this notion 
more precise by developing a model where the quality of a bank’s proprietary information 
is negatively related to the physical distance between bank and borrower to capture the 
varying degrees of informational expertise present in modern banking. Because banks 
receive more precise signals about close borrowers, competing banks face increasing 
adverse selection problems when approaching these locally captured ﬁrms. As the distance 
between the borrower and the informed bank2 increases, this bank’s information advantage 
decreases, and the uninformed bank3 is able to bid more frequently so that, in equilibrium, 
the likelihood of a competing loan offer increases in bank-borrower distance. Hence, the 
spatial pricing model based on informational asymmetries developed by Hauswald and 
Marquez (2006) show that geographical credit rationing by banks can occur in equilibrium, 
where the underlying rationale is an adverse selection mechanism à la Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981). Type II errors in credit offers always increase on the bank borrower distance but the 
effect on type I errors is ambiguous and depends on the quality of information. 
2 The closest bank from the borrower.
3 The closest competitor from the informed bank.84 
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  A simple theoretical model to rationalize the existence of geographical credit 
rationing developed by Carling and Lundberg (2005) leads to a similar prediction than in 
Hauswald and Marquez (2006). They also suggest that the creditworthiness signal’s quality 
is decreasing in the borrower’s distance to the bank and demonstrate that the bank’s optimal 
strategy is to turn down credit applicants from some distantly located ﬁrms. 
  To summarize, we could suppose that the relationship between the distance and 
credit rationing is non linear. In fact, when the distance is low (the quality of the signal 
is high), the probability that the informed bank correctly identiﬁes the borrower increases 
toward one, then the likelihood of doing type I and II errors is low as well as the probability 
of credit rationing equilibrium. As long as the distance increases but remains at a level that 
is below a certain threshold, the likelihood of doing type I and II errors increases as well 
as the probability of credit rationing equilibrium. For values of distance that are above 
this threshold, the quality of the signal is very bad for informed banks and the uninformed 
lender faces a less severe adverse selection threat and is therefore more likely to extend a 
loan offer.
 Empirical  ﬁndings on the effects of physical proximity of banks to borrowers are 
mixed. At the bank level, Petersen and Rajan (2002) ﬁnd that remote applicants are more 
likely to be declined credits in the U.S. but this effect is strongly decreasing over time. 
In contrast, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) ﬁnd that credit availability decrease with the 
bank-borrower distance and increase with the borrower-competitor distance. However, 
the statistical signiﬁcance of these relations disappears when they control for the bank’s 
proprietary information (the bank’s internal credit score) concluding that the geographical 
distance is a simple proxy for lender’s informational advantage. However, Carling and 
Lundberg (2005), using data on corporate loans granted between 1994 and 2000 by a 
leading Swedish bank, ﬁnd no evidence of geographical credit rationing. Uchida et al. 
(2008), using a unique Japanese data set and the same methodology as Berger et al. (2005) 
obtained no evidence of geographical credit rationing in Japan. 
  At the market level, Avery and Samolyk (2000), using U.S. data, ﬁnd that the number 
of banks operating in a Metropolitan Statistical Area is positively but weakly related to the 
growth rate of SME’s loans in the local market, whereas the number of ofﬁces has no impact 
at all on this growth rate. Using Italian data, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2001) ﬁnd that 
the branch density (the ratio of branches to population) in a province is positively related to 
the volume of credit for small borrowers but it is negatively associated with the volume of 
bad loans. Benfratello et al. (2008), using a rich data set on innovation at the ﬁrm level for 
a large number of Italian ﬁrms over the 90’s, ﬁnd that the banking development (computed 
as the number of branches divided by population) affects positively the probability of 
process innovation, particularly for small ﬁrms and for ﬁrms in high(er) tech sectors and 
in sectors more dependent upon external ﬁnance. There is also some evidence that banking 
development reduces the cash ﬂow sensitivity of ﬁxed investment spending, particularly 
for small ﬁrms.85 
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2.2  Why the geographical distribution of banks’ decisional centers should affects 
small business lending? theory and evidence
  The process of ﬁnancial integration in the European and U.S. banking industry in 
the 1990s was accompanied by the debate about the beneﬁts of strengthened competition 
in credit markets, greater efﬁciency and the geographical reach of banking groups through 
afﬁliated banks and branches. This would have assured an adequate response to the need 
of local economies. However, the growing body of research examining the effects of bank 
consolidation and organizational structure on lending policies raises the question, for a 
long time neglected, of the cost of the predictable geographical concentration of decisional 
centres and the increasing size and complexity of bank organisation induced by the 
spectacular wave of bank mergers and acquisitions. Put differently, this body of research 
highlights the fact that the organizational complexity of the institutions to which the loan 
ofﬁce belongs is as much important as the operational proximity in the process of credit 
allocation to small businesses.
  Academics assess the potential implications of induced changes in the banks 
organizational structure on small business lending by analyzing organizational theories. 
The general outcome of these theories is that small banks should be more inclined than 
large and complex banks to extend credits to small and opaque ﬁrms. The main argument 
supporting this claim is the existence of organizational diseconomies that limit the scope of 
large banks in their lending activities. The motivation of such organizational diseconomies 
has been widely debated by academics using several theories but it seems that they come 
from a common origin – the inherent difference between small business lending and 
transactions-based lending.
  In small business lending, the bank bases its credit decisions largely on private or soft 
information about the ﬁrm and its owner that is collected through multiple interactions over 
time and across products (Boot, 2000; Berger and Udell, 2002). Soft information may confer 
the bank with a competitive informational advantage over banks that base their decision 
on public information and thus obtain a more precise signal of the creditworthiness of the 
ﬁrm. However, the collection method of this information needs to be personal, making soft 
information hardly veriﬁable and thus difﬁcult to transmit to upper echelons of banking 
organization and to store (Stein, 2002). Therefore, the lack of adequate soft information 
transmission channels within a bank requires organizational adjustments, which is costly 
(Crémer et al., 2007).
  The idea that a centralized bank (e.g. a large bank holding company) is less 
competent in relationship lending than a decentralized bank (e.g. a small community bank) 
has been theoretically demonstrated by Stein (2002) that shows that in hierarchically 
complex organizations, loan ofﬁcers have less incentive to collect soft information since 
they are excluded from the decision making but have to report that information to their 
superiors. However, information research efforts by loan ofﬁcers are well recognized by a 
decentralized organization that ensure to them access to funds necessary to capitalize on 
that expertise.86 
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  Berger and Udell (2002) suggest a different mechanism to motivate the existence 
of organizational diseconomies in large banks. It consists on internal agency problems 
between the loan ofﬁcer – considered as a receptacle of soft information-and his superior 
and stem from the intangible nature of soft information and, in particular, from the difﬁculty 
in diffusing this information within a large and complex organisation. The necessary trade-
off between delegation and control have been analyzed in the principal-agent theory In 
fact, Udell (1989) and Berger and Udell (2002) show that the specialization in relationship 
lending (e.g. small business lending) should go hand in hand with more investment in loan 
ofﬁcers control. This endows small decentralized banks with another source of comparative 
advantage in small business lending.
  A considerable research effort has been devoted to empirically test the relation 
between bank’s organizational structure and credit availability to small ﬁrms. First, 
numerous studies show that bank organizational complexity implies a reduction in the 
availability of credit to small businesses (Berger et al., 1999). Small ﬁrms are, in fact, 
highly dependent on bank ﬁnancing (Berger and Udell, 1998; Cole et al., 1996) and this 
is aggravated by the evidence that large banks allocate fewer resources to small business 
lending than do small banks because they have a real competitive disadvantage in evaluating 
their creditworthiness (Berger and Udell, 1996; Keeton, 1995; Peek and Rosengren, 1996; 
De Young et al., 1999; Alessandrini et al., 2008; Sapienza, 2002). Contradictory evidence 
are provided by Jayaratne and Wolken (1999) that ﬁnd that the SME rationing probability 
is not signiﬁcantly related to the presence of small banks in the market, suggesting the 
absence of a cost advantage of small banks in originating credit to small borrowers. 
  When focusing on the empirical literature analysing the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) on credit supply to small ﬁrms, we notice the lack of consensus on 
this issue. On the one hand, Strahan and Weston (1996; 1998) show that small bank M&As 
have a positive effect on small business lending, however Berger et al. (1998) and Peek and 
Rosengren (1998) ﬁnd that large bank M&As have the opposite effect. 
  At the market level, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) ﬁnd that the creation 
of industrial ﬁrms in a giving province in Italy is positively associated with the share of 
deposits held by banks headquartered in the same province (one measure of functional 
distance). Collender and Shaffer (2003), studying the impact of functional distance on local 
economic growth, ﬁnd that the impact of the number of bank ofﬁces operating locally on 
local economic growth differs signiﬁcantly with the locus of their ownership.
2.3  Why SMEs may be ﬁnancially constrained? 
  The availability of external ﬁnance for SMEs is a topic of signiﬁcant research 
interest to academics and an issue of great importance to policy makers around the globe. 
Bank credit still remains the major source of external ﬁnancing for SMEs. In fact, a 
conventional wisdom in the contemporary corporate ﬁnance literature argues that problems 
of information asymmetry, described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers and Majluf 
(1984) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), are particularly acute for SMEs (Ang, 1991; Carpenter 87 
Distances and Small Business Credit Constraints: The French case
and Petersen, 2002), since beyond the shareholders’ motivation of avoiding the dilution 
of ownership and their desire to keep control of the business, the prosperity of SMEs is 
affected by hidden information, the lack or low level of collateral and the lack of any 
history or reliable ﬁnancial information and audited accounting records (Holmes and Kent, 
1991; Ang, 1991; Chittenden et al., 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998). The lack of sufﬁcient 
information to determine the quality of different investment projects in the SME as well 
as the quality of management for making investment decisions determines the level of risk 
that external creditor face. A high level of risk (a high level of opacity) is then reﬂected 
through the credit denial decision. It is important to note that the implication of asymmetric 
information is not that lending to SMEs is necessarily a risky job but that the assessment of 
this risk is challenging. 
  In this paper, we aim to evaluate the impact of the changing structure of the French 
banking system in terms of higher diffusion-concentration on local ﬁrms  ﬁnancing 
constraints. We particularly address the issues of endogeneity of functional distance and 
operational proximity, used as measures of this diffusion-concentration, as well as omitted 
variables by using system GMM estimations. Also, we take the same new measure of local 
banking structure adopted by Alessandrini et al. (2009) that takes into account the distance 
of local branches from their own headquarters. This measure of functional distance 
is challenging the view that it is a characteristic that banks either have or do not have, 
regardless of their location. Instead, we suggest that all banks are subject to organizational 
issues then we propose a continuous measure of local banking structure. 
3.  Data and variables
3.1 Dataset
  To test the effects of spatial diffusion-concentration on SME lending, we build up 
a panel dataset containing information on ﬁrms, bank branches, head ofﬁce locations, and 
macro variables in France at the departmental level. The time period considered ranges 
from 2001 – 2008. After cleaning, we have around 11 000 observations.
  The dataset relies on four main sources. SME speciﬁc information is drawn from a 
well known database DIANE4. We consider French manufacturing enterprises with 1-500 
employees from which we exclude those who are subsidiaries of groups because of their 
ﬁnancial dependence of the group. We randomly selected and stratiﬁed ﬁrms by size (four 
classes of employees), technology-intensive industry (four classes according to the SESSI5 
classiﬁcation) and geographical area (six mega regions). 
  In general, we eliminated observations in the extreme percentiles of the distribution 
of proﬁt ratios. We did the same for observations showing an accumulation rate above 150% 
4  DIANE: DIsque pour l’ANalyse Economique, edited by the Bureau van Dijk.
5  SESSI: Service of industry studies and statistics. Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry 
(France).88 
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and a tripling of sales in order to avoid retaining in the sample ﬁrms that have undergone 
major restructuring. 
  Data on geographical distribution at the departmental level of all bank branches are 
from the banks’ location ﬁles of the Bank of France. Information on the composition of 
banking groups and the location of bank head ofﬁces is from banks annual reports. We 
obtain the geographical location of all head ofﬁces and their changes over time generated 
by intra group consolidations (especially for mutual and savings bank groups) by tracking 
the groups’ annual reports. The number of workers employed by sector s in department 
d is from Unedic statistics and macroeconomic data on sectorial deﬂators of industry 
output and nominal investment and data on the population at the departmental level is from 
the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). Appendix B deﬁnes 
the variables employed in the empirical speciﬁcations and provides their mean, median, 
standard deviation and sources.
3.2 Distances
3.2.1  The banking system operational proximity
  The notion of operational distance is the one usually examined in the banking 
literature. It is conceivable to assume that the number of bank branches in a giving 
geographical area (here the department) is typically positively related to the operational 
proximity  () OP  of the banking system to this area. To measure this notion, we build up 
the most widely used index of bank presence in an area (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 
2001; Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2003; Benfratello et al., 2008; Alessandrini et al., 2009), which 
allows us to easily compare our results with literature. It is a branch density index in terms 
of population:
 
1  
_ *10000
 
d b
b b
d
d
Branchnumber
OP POP
Population
where  d b  is the total number of banks operating in the department  ( 1, , 96)  dd
  Of course, one can argue that this measure may be a better proxy for competition 
than for proximity. This is a problem as the literature indicated different outcomes for 
proximity and competition on credit availability. It is probably not the case because two 
departments having the same degree of competition may show different number of branches 
and thus different degree of proximity. For example, two departments with equal number of 
banks (equal degree of competition) may show very different operational proximity. In this 
respect, it is worth noting that  _ d OP POP  is only slightly correlated with the departmental 
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman concentration index HHI  (see Table 1), suggesting that operational 
proximity and competition are two different elements.89 
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Table 1: Pairwise Correlation Matrix
  I/K CF/K FD_KM FD_ECO OP_POP Δy HHI
I/K 1
CF/K 0.2428*** 1
FD_KM -0.0131* -0.0904*** 1
FD_ECO -0.0114 -0.0452*** 0.5637*** 1
OP_POP -0.0032 0.0232*** -0.1481*** -0.3930*** 1
Δy 0.1348*** 0.1657*** 0.0019 -0.0123 -0.0071 1
HHI 0.0217*** -0.0934*** 0.3616*** 0.1665*** 0.1301*** 0.0006 1
***, **, * signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
3.2.2  The banking system functional distance
  Functional proximity is usually measured as the proportion of local credit market 
(in terms of branches or deposits) controlled by banks that concentrate their activities in a 
delimited area. This measure implicitly assumes that functional distance is a dichotomous 
character that concerns only some, usually small, mutual and cooperative, banks and not the 
others. According to Alessandrini et al. (2009), functional distance is ‘a character shared 
to some extent by all banks that, given the localism of their decisional centres and strategic 
functions, are necessarily close to some areas and far from others’. To this respect, while a 
department with banking system formed by only local credit banks has the lowest value of 
functional distance indicators; it is also true that two departments with equally functionally 
distant banking systems may show very different proportion of local banks.
  We adopt measures of functional distance at the departmental level advanced by 
Alessandrini et al. (2009). We compute the functional distance of the banking system from 
department d by weighting the proportion of each bank branches operating in the department 
d by the distance indicator that captures the severity of information asymmetries between 
the senior manager at the parent bank and the bank ofﬁcer at the local branch. Organizational 
frictions induced by these information asymmetries are considered positively correlated to 
the distance between the bank’s headquarter and the local lending ofﬁce. 
  We build up two alternative functional distance indexes. The ﬁrst one is:
1
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  The physical distance is the kilometric orthodromic6 distance between the local 
capital town (also called a prefecture) of the department d in which the branch is located 
6 Also called ‘as the crow ﬂies distance’ or ‘great-circle distance’ and deﬁned as the shortest 
distance between any two points of a sphere.90 
Salima Djedidi Kooli
and the local capital town of the department h (h = 1,...,96) where the head ofﬁce of the own 
(parent) bank is headquartered (Physical distancedd = 0 when a bank branch and its head 
ofﬁce are in the same department d ). 
  The second indicator of function distance is:
 
1
1
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  The economic gap (or distance) measured as  1   
m
ss ds h EE  is an index of the 
economic structure difference between departments d and h computed using shares of 
workers E employed by m economic sectors. The idea behind the use of this indicator 
of functional distance is that as differences increase in the economic structure of the 
departments where the parent bank and local branch are located, so does the informational 
rent of local loan ofﬁcers who can accumulate speciﬁc knowledge on the local economy.   
  Functional distance indexes are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with one 
another and uncorrelated with operational proximity indexes. This corroborates the idea 
that functional distance includes physical and economic distances.
3.3  Measuring credit constraints
  It is difﬁcult to directly measure ﬁnancial constraints that prevent ﬁrms from 
investing as much as they wish. Problems of information asymmetry related to the quality 
of investment projects and the management competence of the business owner are mainly 
what may interfere with the functioning of ﬁnancial markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984). These problems imply that in general, ﬁrms use primarily 
internal resources to ﬁnance their investments before turning to external ﬁnancing sources 
and especially to traditional bank ﬁnancing. This is the case for French SMEs (as shown by 
Appendix C). 
  The elusiveness of the notion of credit constraints makes it hard to measure. In fact, 
what we generally observe in the ﬁrms balance-sheets is the quantity of loan made, not 
the amount requested and the amount granted. Therefore, many proxy variables where 
proposed in the literature.
  The proxy of ﬁnancing constraints used in this paper is drawn from the large strand of 
literature which investigates the sensitivity of ﬁrm’s investment to the cash ﬂow7 (Fazzari 
et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Fazzari et al. (1988) classify ﬁrms according to 
whether they were likely to be ﬁnancially constrained on the basis of their size, dividend 
payouts and capital structure. These characteristics determine whether they are more 
sensitive to the supply of internal funds measured by cash ﬂow. The highest sensitivities 
7 Other proxies for credit rationing are those of Kugler (1987) and King (1986) that attempt to 
estimate equilibrium credit rationing. Clearly (1999) uses multiple discriminant analysis to identify 
ﬁrms with ﬁnancing constraints.91 
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to cash ﬂow are found for ﬁrms classiﬁed as ﬁnancially constrained. Many further studies 
have followed the same methodology including Chirinko and Schaller (1995), Hubbard et 
al. (1995), Calomaris and Hubbard (1995), as summarized by Hubbard (1998).
3.4 Descriptive  statistics
  Figures 1 and 3 show a signiﬁcant increase (on average) of both operational 
proximity (from 4.201 branches per 10 000 inhabitants in 2001 to 4.378 branches per 
10 000 inhabitants in 2008) and functional distance (from around 27 km in 2001 to around 
34 km in 2008) of the banking system to French departments. As a matter of fact, it is worth 
noting that functional distance has increased at higher pace than operational proximity 
showing that the trend toward the internal grouping of mutual networks is stronger than the 
recent process of banking supply system reinforcement. Table 2 shows that operational and 
functional distances measures have both a greater variability across departments (between 
variation) than over time (within variation). The regional distribution of distance indicators 
in 2008 shows that the banking system is operationally more proximate to the East, West, 
and Center than to the North and South (see Figures 2 and 4). It is functionally more distant 
to the East, Center, North, and South than to the West. However, it is interesting to mention 
that the 2001 – 2008 regional operational proximity growth rate is the highest in the North 
and in the South, and that the functional distance growth rate is the highest in the West, 
Center and East.
Table 2: Banking distance variables: summary statistics
Year
FD_KM FD_ECO OP_POP
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
2001 3.320 1.133 0.230 0.094 4.210 0.891
2002 3.361 1.145 0.230 0.091 4.205 0.874
2003 3.402 1.121 0.230 0.089 4.197 0.786
2004 3.422 1.116 0.230 0.088 4.243 0.772
2005 3.438 1.115 0.229 0.088 4.308 0.769
2006 3.462 1.112 0.240 0.089 4.343 0.766
2007 3.496 1.156 0.232 0.099 4.347 0.752
2008 3.561 1.171 0.240 0.097 4.378 0.75492 
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2001 – 2008 Growth rates
France 7.26% 6.61% 4%
North 3.55% 3.64% 6.59%
West 12.27% 10.21% -1.56%
Centre 12.08% 7.92% 0.28%
East 11.91% 6.45% 2.20%
South West 3.96% 1.65% 6.34%
South East 2.35% -1.24% 7.01%
Overall, Between and Within variations (across departments)
Overall 1.141 0.092 0.796
Between 1.118 0.090 0.777
Within 0.226 0.016 0.172
Note: The table reports the summary statistics for the banking distance variables (deﬁned above). 
In the last part of the table, we report the overall, within and between variations of these variables 
across departments.93 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the operational proximity by region, 2001 – 2008.
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Figure 2: Operational proximity in the 96 French departments, 2008
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Figure 3: Evolution of the physical functional distance by region, 2001 – 2008

3
3,1
3,2
3,3
3,4
3,5
3,6
3,7
3,8
3,9
4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
North West Centre
East South France
Figure 4: Physical functional distance in the 96 French departments, 2008
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4.  The empirical strategy
4.1 A  proﬁt-accelerator investment model
 We  ﬁrst model the optimal ﬁrm demand of capital based on the neoclassical theory of 
investment as it was presented by Jorgenson (1963). The intertemporal maximization of the 
ﬁrm value leads to the optimal capital stock by equalizing its marginal productivity value 
with its user cost. Accordingly, under the assumption of a ﬁrm taking prices as given on a 
perfectly competitive market or facing a constant price elasticity function of good demand 
in a market of imperfect competition and assuming that the ﬁrm has a constant elasticity 
of substitution production function and no adjustment costs, the optimal capital stock is 
proportional to output,
  it it it ky h    (1)
with  it k  and  it y  the log of optimal capital stock and the log of output.  it h  is a function of 
the user cost. The introduction of adjustment costs results in a gradual adjustment of capital 
stock to its optimal value (Hall and Jorgenson, 1971). Modelling the adjustment process 
between  it k  and  it y  requires the incorporation of a long run relationship between capital 
and sales in an autoregressive distributed lag model (2,2) with two lags for the capital and 
two lags for sales. This speciﬁcation seems sufﬁcient ﬂexible yet parsimonious because it 
introduces an autoregressive process on  it k  to take into account the adjustment dynamic. 
In the estimates, the variation of  it h , that includes the user cost, the capital depreciation for 
each ﬁrm and the productivity term, is taken into account by the ﬁxed effects speciﬁc to 
ﬁrms  i   and a set for time dummies   t  . Thus, we obtain the following linear regression:
  11 22 0 11 2 2 it i t it it it it it it kk k y y y                (2)
with   it   the random error term of the regression. Instead of directly estimate this regression 
(4.2) (which could pose a problem because of strong collinearity between variables), we 
rewrite it in an error correction format adopted in several recent studies (Bond et al., 2003; 
Bond et al., 2005; Mairesse et al., 2001; Mizen and Vermeulen, 2005). 
 
  
    
11 00 1 1
12 2 2 01 212 2
1
                       1 1
it i t it it it
it it it it
kk y y
ky y
    
  

 
    
        
 (3)
  Thus, we obtain a relation linking current growth rates of capital stock and sales with 
those of the previous period and evolving the error correction term, i.e. the gap between the 
current capital stock and the optimal capital stock, and a scale factor.
  The importance of ﬁnancial constraints in this model can be ascertained by including 
the proﬁt rate, measured as the cash ﬂow scaled by capital, to the relation (3), as a measure of 
the supply of internal funds in the regression. Since the aim of the paper is to test the effects 
of operational proximity and functional distance on the sensitiveness of ﬁrm investment to 
cash ﬂow, we interact cash ﬂow with operational proximity, squared operational proximity 96 
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and functional distance indicators. The idea behind these interaction terms is that we make 
the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity a non linear function of OP but linearly related to FD. 
In fact, this measure of the supply of internal funds becomes:
 
2
01 2 3  
I
K OP OP FD
CF
K
  
 
   
 

 (4)
  Then, by assuming that the change in the capital stock can be approximated by 
investment over previous capital stock less depreciation8, 
,
1
it
it
it
I
k
K


 , we can rewrite 
the regression (3) in panel data format:

1
10 1 1 2 2 2 0
12 1
2
123
111
__   
tt t
i t idt idt it it it
tt t id id id
ttt
dt dt dt it
ttt id id id
II C F
yy k yy
KK K
CF CF CF
OP POP OP POP FD
KKK
     
 

  
 

  
         
  
  
        
    
(5)
  Geographic and technological intensity industry classiﬁcation dummies are included 
in the basic speciﬁcation of equation (5) to control for other unobserved local ﬁxed effects.
  In this speciﬁcation, the parameter would be negative or near zero because we 
generally have negative autocorrelation between capital stock growth rates of two successive 
periods when using individual ﬁrm data. The long-run properties of this speciﬁcation 
solely depend on the coefﬁcient of the error correction  12 1     and the scale factor 
012 12 1        . It is expected that λ is negative because when the level of 
existing stock of capital is above the optimal stock (as determined by sales), there should 
be a reduction in the capital accumulation rate and conversely, if less, an increase. We also 
expect that  0 0    which suppose that French SMEs are ﬁnancially constrained. 
  Following Hauswald and Marquez (2006), we expect that
H1:  the relationship between operational proximity and ﬁnancing constraints 
is non monotone with an investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity supposed to be 
increasing for low levels of OP below a certain threshold and decreasing for 
high levels of OP above the same threshold. 
  This implies a positive  1   and a negative  2  . 
  Following the theoretical literature on the impact of functional distance on ﬁnancing 
constraints described above, we expect that:
8 We assume that the capital stock rate of depreciation is taken into account by the individual 
effects and time dummies  i   and  t  .97 
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H2:  the increase of the functional distance induces an increase of the investment 
cash ﬂow sensitivity.
  This implies a positive  3  .
  Giving that smaller ﬁrms are more likely to be rationed than greater ones, it is 
interesting to verify that:
H3:   the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity is lower for large ﬁrms comparing to 
small ﬁrms which are supposed to be more ﬁnancially constrained. 
H4:   the functional distances affect differently small and large ﬁrm’s investment 
sensitivities to cash ﬂows.
  To do this, we run two other speciﬁ  cations by interacting ﬁ  rm size with 
1
*
t
t
CF
FD
K 



.
4.2 Estimation  methodology
  The dynamic structure of the model by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
makes usual estimators of ﬁxed effect panel data biased and inconsistent (Verbeek, 2012; 
Wooldridge, 2010). By construction, the correlation between the lagged dependent variable 
and the error component renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent even if the 
it   are not serially correlated (Sevestre and Trognon, 1985). For the ﬁxed effects (FE) 
estimator, the Within transformation wipes out the ﬁxed effects but the correlation still 
persists between the transformed lagged dependent variable and errors, even if the  it   are 
not serially correlated (Nickell, 1981) . It is well known that only if    T  will the Within 
estimator of the autoregressive parameter be consistent for the dynamic error component 
model, which is not the case.
  An alternative to the Within estimator consists on applying OLS to the model written 
in ﬁrst differences. In this case, correlation between the predetermined explanatory variables 
and the reminder error is easier to handle. This solution is less satisfactory because unlike 
Within estimator, the ﬁrst differences (FD) estimator is biased and inconsistent even when 
N and T both tend to inﬁnity.
  The instrumental variable (IV) estimation methods (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981) are 
known to have better performances than these usual methods. They lead to consistent but 
not necessarily efﬁcient estimates of the parameters in the model because it suffers from 
a signiﬁcant loss of degrees of freedom, and it does not take into account the differenced 
structure on the residual disturbances.
  Arellano and Bond were the ﬁrst in 1991 to propose an extension of the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) in case of panel data. Their estimator were designed to avoid 
two causes of inefﬁciency of Anderson and Hsiao estimator namely the small number 
of instruments and the lack of consideration of the autocorrelation disturbance. From 
the model in ﬁrst differences, Arellano and Bond (1991) note that the lagged dependent 98 
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variable can be considered as an instrument when the  it   are not serially correlated. In this 
case, orthogonality conditions are:
   0                2, ,        2, ,   it j it E y for t T and j T      
  However, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator suffers from the loss of information 
associated with the ﬁrst differences model which often leads to imprecise and erratic 
estimates.
  For all these reasons, we decide to use the system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
that is known to be more efﬁ  cient than the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. The Blundell 
and Bond (1998) GMM method is based on the estimation of a system of two simultaneous 
equations, one in levels (with lagged ﬁ  rst differences as instruments) and the other in ﬁ  rst 
differences (with lagged levels as instruments). This method has the advantage of adding 
other orthogonality conditions   0            2, ,        2 ,  , it j it E y for t T and j T        in 
order to obtain an estimator with greater accuracy. Indeed, Blundell and Bond (1998) show, 
using Monte-Carlo simulations, that the use of this double set of instruments improves the 
estimates’ quality (Roodman, 2009).
 
4.3 Results
  Table 3 displays the estimation results of the basic and augmented speciﬁcations. 
As expected, we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient related to the ﬁrst lagged accumulation ratio is 
negative and signiﬁcant, which is consistent with the idea that there is less incentive to 
currently invest in ﬁxed capital for a ﬁrm that invested last year. Another interesting ﬁnding 
is the negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient related to the error correction term, showing that 
the error correction is playing in the ‘right way’ by reducing the capital accumulation rate 
when the level of existing stock of capital is above the optimal stock and by increasing the 
accumulation rate when the opposite occurs. We also ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant effects of 
current and lagged sales growth rates on the accumulation rate, highlighting the importance 
of the accelerator effect. In fact, rising sales growth rate implies that proﬁt expectations 
and business conﬁdence rise, encouraging businesses to build more factories and other 
buildings and to install more machinery.
  On the whole and regarding the interest variables, the results on the sensitivity of 
investment to cash ﬂow are consistent with those on credit constraints described in section 
2. Investment of ﬁrms in departments with a functionally more distant banking system is 
more sensitive to cash ﬂow, and this effect decreases with size. All speciﬁcations display a 
positive coefﬁcient on the interaction term    /* CF K FD showing that the marginal effect 
of cash ﬂows on investment is increasing with the physical distance and the economic gap 
between the branch and the parent bank departments. These ﬁndings conﬁrm the idea that 
the severity of communication and incentive problems as well as their negative impact on 
lending policies and credit allocation grows with the distance between bank’s hierarchical 
levels (Alessandrini et al., 2009).99 
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  We also consider a possible direct effect of functional distance on investment by 
introducing FD as an isolated term in eq. (5) (see Table 3, speciﬁcations (2), (4), (6) and 
(8)). Nevertheless, they appear to be statistically insigniﬁcant without affecting the other 
estimation coefﬁcients9. This ﬁnding shows that the effect of functional distance on the 
capital accumulation behavior is indirect. In fact, FD impacts access conditions to external 
ﬁnancing that, in turn, affects the amount invested. Thus, as Benfratello et al. (2008) and 
Alessandrini et al. (2009), we prefer to concentrate on the indirect effect of distance on 
ﬁrms’ investment through its impact on ﬁnancing constraints.
  The results of the augmented speciﬁcation (columns (6), (7), (8) and (9)) point 
out signiﬁcant differences in the impact of functional distance on investment-cash ﬂow 
sensitivity according to ﬁrm size. From column (6), we can see that the larger is the ﬁrm, 
the lower is the contribution of FD_KM to the marginal effect of cash ﬂow on investment. 
This relation is signiﬁcant for all ﬁrm size groups. In fact, the effect for the fourth size class 
(251 – 500 workers) is signiﬁcantly lower than that of the benchmark case, constituted by 
the smallest group (01 – 09 workers). This trend is also conﬁrmed for the other measure 
of functional distance in economic terms even if for this case the effect seems to be more 
pronounced. These ﬁndings are broadly consistent with the theoretical prediction stipulating 
that larger ﬁrms suffer less from the lack of banks’ decisional centres in the department 
where they are located. The declining impact of functional distance on investment cash 
ﬂow sensitivity according to the ﬁrm size group is reﬂected in the measure of elasticities 
of investment to cash ﬂow according to size, as shown by the last part of Table 3. It is 
interesting to note that the capital accumulation behavior is very elastic to ﬁrm liquidity 
(internal ﬁnancing) and this is even more important than the ﬁrm size is low. We can also 
note that the effect of size is the same for the third and the fourth size classes suggesting that 
for companies with more than 250 employees, the negative impact of functional distance is 
rather the same.
  With regard to operational proximity, our ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical 
prediction advanced by Hauswald and Marquez (2006). In fact, we ﬁnd that the relationship 
between operational proximity and ﬁnancing constraints is signiﬁcantly non monotone with 
an investment cash ﬂow sensitivity supposed to be increasing with operational proximity 
for low levels of OP_POP and decreasing for high levels of it. More explicitly, for values 
of operational proximity below the value of 4.74 or 4.6810, corresponding approximately 
to the 75th percentile of the OP_POP distribution, the probability that the lending bank is 
located near the ﬁrm is low, the credit screen quality is relatively uninformative and thus 
adverse selection problems are high (see Figure 5). This intensiﬁcation of adverse selection 
problems due to low operational proximity generates an aggravation of ﬁrm external 
ﬁnancing conditions and thus an increase of the investment cash ﬂow sensitivity. However, 
for values of operational proximity beyond this threshold, the probability that the lending 
bank is located near the ﬁrm is high, the credit screen quality is sufﬁciently high and thus 
adverse selection problems are low.   
9  see Table 3 and compare speciﬁcations (2) vs (3), (4) vs (5), (6) vs (7) and (8) vs (9).
10  Respectively from speciﬁcations (3) and (5)100 
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  The consistencies of these results are conﬁrmed by the validation of the instrument 
set at 5% and the reject of serial correlation in the original error, as desired (see Appendix D 
for more details). The dummies are generally not signiﬁcant, except for dummies relatives 
to 2001 and 2002 years that shows positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, except for industry 
dummies which shows signiﬁcantly higher investment capabilities for low and medium 
technological sectors.
Figure 5: Illustration of the relationship between the investment cash ﬂow sensitivity 
and the operational proximity
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6. Conclusion
  In this paper, we have tried to assess the impact of geographical diffusion of banking 
structures and instruments as well as geographical concentration of decisional and strategic 
centres of banking institutions over the period 2001 – 2008 on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints. 
Our econometric exercise consistently show that increased functional distance made 
ﬁnancing constraints more binding, as indicated by the positive coefﬁcient relying it with 
the investment cash-ﬂow sensitivity. Interestingly, with regard to operational proximity, 
our ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical prediction of non linearity of the operational 
proximity with ﬁnancing constraints advanced by Hauswald and Marquez (2006). This 
ﬁnding conﬁrms the informational capture that an operationally close banking system may 
exercise on local borrowers as well as adverse selection problems arising when approaching 
these locally captured ﬁrms.
  There are two policy-oriented implications of our ﬁndings. First, the consolidation 
of the French banking industry, leading to an increase of the functional distance may 
aggravate ﬁnancing problems of small local ﬁrms, especially in peripheral departments. 
As Alessandrini et al. (2009) and before Berger and Udell (2006) have pointed out, these 
negative externalities of market deregulation could be reduced by ‘favoring a change in 
emphasis in bank organization from the search of economies of scale by standardized, 
arm’s-length lending technologies, to economies of scope by making specialized credit 
instruments available to local ﬁrms’. Second, our ﬁndings regarding operational proximity 
and its impact on SME ﬁnancing suggest that the French banking system should be more 
operationally proximate to local ﬁrms to better ﬁt their funding needs and to promote the 
entry and creation of new banks and non-bank competitors struggling to offer ﬁnancing to 
local ﬁrms. Despite commendable efforts made by certain banking groups since the early 
2000s to reinforce the French banking system’s supply by opening new branches, much 
remains to be done in this ﬁeld. 
  Finally, our results are particularly suggestive of the persistent importance of 
relationship lending for small opaque borrowers despite the technological progress that 
signiﬁcantly expands the ability of banks to produce hard information and therefore 
substitute transactions-based lending for relationship lending and basel II recommendations 
that push banks to develop sophisticated credit scoring models, largely based on hard 
information, to assess the credit risk.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Recent changes in the French banking sector
A.1: The French banking sector consolidation
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A.2: The emblematic internal grouping of cooperative networks
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A.3: Branches, ATMs and employees evolution 
in the French banking system, 1999 – 2008
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Appendix B: Data description
Variables Deﬁnition Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Dependent variable
(I/K) The  ﬁrm-level accumulation 
ratio. 
20.22% 12.12% 23.83% 0 149.46% Author’s 
calculation 
on Balance 
Sheet data 
in DIANE 
Explanatory variables
(CF/K) The  ﬁrm-level ratio of proﬁt 
rate. CF is computed as net prof-
it plus depreciation allowances.
53.63% 37.78% 52.74% -34.09% 295.26%
Author’s 
calculation 
on Balance 
Sheet data 
in DIANE
Δy The ﬁrm’s annual growth rate 
of total sales.
2.46% 2.52% 17.93% -69.79% 286.67%
(k–y) Error correction term. It is 
the gap between the current 
capital stock and the optimal 
capital stock.
-1.90 -1.88 0.85 -5,47 8.52
FD_KM The  ﬁrst measure of the or-
ganizational structure of the 
local banking system. It is the 
physical functional distance, 
computed as the ratio of bank 
b branches to total branches in 
department d weighted by the 
logarithm of 1 plus the ortho-
dromic distance between the 
department of the branch and 
the department where the par-
ent bank is headquartered.
3.4473 3.2833 1.1409 0.647 6.031 Author’s 
calculation 
on Bank of 
France data 
and Banks 
annual  
reports
FD_ECO The second measure of the 
organizational structure of the 
local banking system. It is the 
economic functional distance, 
computed as the ratio of bank 
b branches to total branches in 
department d weighted by the 
logarithm of 1 plus the index 
of the economic structure dif-
ference between the depart-
ment of the branch and the 
department where the parent 
bank is headquartered in terms 
of shares of workers employed 
by m economic sectors.
0.2337 0.214 0.0919 0.0561 0.5119 Author’s 
calculation 
on Unedic 
statistics 
(UNISTA-
TIS)111 
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OP_POP The ﬁrst departmental indica-
tor of the local banking sys-
tem operational proximity to a 
department d. It is a measure 
of the branch density in this 
department, computed as the 
number of bank branches in 
department d per 10 000 in-
habitants.
4.2901 4.2384 0.7959 2.4187 8.3849 Author’s 
calculation 
on Bank 
of France 
and INSEE 
data
HHI Herﬁndahl-Hirschman con-
centration index is com-
puted on the number of bank 
branches in a deparment.
0.146 0.148 0.045 0.014 0.014 Author’s 
calculation 
on Bank 
of France 
data.
Size1 is 1 if [01 - 09] employees 29.31%
Firm data 
in DIANE
Size2 is 1 if [10 - 49] employees 42.24%
Size3 is 1 if [50 - 250] employees 24.56%
Size4 is 1 if [251 - 500] employees 3.89%
Tech1 is 1 if the ﬁrm is afﬁliated to 
a low technology manufactur-
ing sector (NAF rév2 code = 
10 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 
- 17 - 18 - 24 - 31)
34.71%
Firm data 
in DIANE 
and SESSI 
Classiﬁca-
tion
Tech2 is 1 if the ﬁrm is afﬁliated to 
a medium-low technology 
manufacturing sector (NAF 
rév2 code =  22 - 23 - 25 - 28 
- 30.1 - 30.2 - 30.9 - 32 - 33)
50.99%
Tech3 is 1 if the ﬁrm is afﬁliated to 
a medium-high technology 
manufacturing sector (NAF 
rév2 code =  20 - 26.5 - 26.6 
- 26.7 - 26.8 - 27.1 - 27.2 - 
27.3 - 27.4 - 27.9 - 29.1 - 29.2 
- 29.3)
10.73%
Tech4 is 1 if the ﬁrm is afﬁliated to a 
high technology manufactur-
ing sector (NAF rév2 code = 
21 - 26.1 - 26.2 - 26.3 - 26.4 
- 30.3 - 30.4)
3.07%112 
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North is 1 if the ﬁrm is located in the 
North of France (Insee region 
codes: 11 - 21 - 22 - 31)
30.3%
Firm data 
in DIANE
West is 1 if the ﬁrm is located in the 
West (Insee region codes: 23 - 
25 - 52 - 53)
12.5%
Center is 1 if the ﬁrm is located in the 
Center (Insee region codes: 24 
- 74 - 83 and Insee department 
codes: 86 - 79)
8.9%
East is 1 if the ﬁrm is located in the 
East (Insee region codes: 26 - 
41 - 42 - 43 - 82)
23.85%
South West is 1 if the ﬁrm is located in 
the South West (Insee region 
codes: 72 – 73 and Insee de-
partment codes: 16-17)
14.3%
South East is 1 if the ﬁrm s located in 
the South East (Insee region 
codes: 91 - 93)
10.15%
Note: I: Investment is measured as the variation between t and t-1 of the ﬁrm’s capital stock (deﬁned 
as tangible assets, gross of depreciation allowances). Investment  11 it it it it IKK K      is deﬂated 
by the sectorial deﬂator of nominal investment (at 2000 prices).  it K  is the net capital stock at the 
end of period t. y: Logarithm of sales at 2000 prices.113 
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Appendix C: French SMEs Investments’ ﬁnancing plan, 2004 – 2009
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Appendix D: Speciﬁcation tests
 The Arellano and Bond test of autocorrelation disturbance
  For consistent estimation, the system-GMM estimators require that the error  , it   be 
serially uncorrelated. 
 Speciﬁcally, if  , it   are serially uncorrelated, then  , it    are correlated with  ,1 it    , 
because     , ,1 , ,1 ,1 ,2 ,1 ,1 ,, ( , ) 0 it it it it it it it it Cov Cov Cov                 . But  , it    
will not be correlated with  , it k     for  2 k  . A test of whether  , it    are correlated with 
,   it k     for  2 k   can be calculated based on the correlation of the residuals  , ˆit   . The 
null hypothesis that   ,, ,0 it it k Cov      for  1,2,3 k   is rejected at a level of 0,05 if 
0,05 p  . As explained, if  , it   are serially uncorrelated, we expect to reject at order 1 but 
not at higher orders. This is indeed the case.
 The overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test
  The validity of an instrument must be tested. This test cannot be performed in a just-
identiﬁed model (a model in which the parameters’ number is equal to instruments’ number). 
But it is possible to test the validity of overidentifying instruments in an overidentiﬁed 
model provided that the parameters of the model are estimated using optimal GMM. 
  The starting point is the ﬁtted value of the criterion function after optimal GMM, 
i.e.,  
1 ˆˆ ˆ 11
() ˆ () Qy X Z Z y X
NN
S  
           
   
 with Z is the instruments matrix 114 
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and 
1 ˆ SW
   with 
1 () WZ Z
    is a positive deﬁnite symmetric-weighting matrix. If the 
population moment conditions   ˆ () 0 EZ y X     are correct, then  ˆ () 0 Zy X    , 
so   ˆ Q   should be  clause to zero (for more details, see Roodman, 2009 and Verbeek, 
2012). Under the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid, it can be shown that 
 ˆ Q   has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of overidentifying restrictions. Large values of   ˆ Q   lead to rejection of 
 0 ˆ :( 0 HE Z yX    . Rejection is interpreted as indicating that at least one of the 
instruments is not valid. Here, for all speciﬁcations, all instruments are valid because 
0,05 p  . 